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replace them with a secularized public square. The replacement campaign grew on the
momentum of the Court’s separationist church and state decisions. In cases challenging
religious symbols, arguments about religious minority status succeeded in the Supreme
Court, which opened the door wider to a field that previously had been ignored by the
professional separationist groups. Particularly in the area of monuments and symbols, the
Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine was incoherent and led to unpredictable results.
The decisions were fractured and the divisions heated. The unstable nature of the doctrine
made it a ripe area for continued litigation, leaving communities uncertain of
constitutional limits. Now, American Legion provides that older symbols are no longer
vulnerable to Establishment Clause challenges except in unusual cases. Using the logic of
the Court’s earlier decisions and concerns about divisiveness, the Court recognizes a
presumption in favor of longstanding monuments, symbols, and practices. American
Legion is a consensus decision that explicitly recognizes tolerance, respect, and citizens
living harmoniously as aims of the Religion Clauses, informed by history and tradition.
American Legion should simplify the task of lower courts in symbols cases. A few legal
questions remain, however, as the center of gravity for disputes is likely to move from
separationist groups challenging old symbols to governments introducing new ones.
Overall, this is a welcome development that rejects the idea that religion must be purged
from the public square. Although the American Legion decision puts an end to the
replacement campaign, it does not provide a robust justification for why public religion is
something to be preserved. Nonetheless, the Court was right to recognize that the
campaign of lawsuits over symbols has sown deep social divisions. The doctrine is now
more evenhanded in its treatment of citizens, and respectful of history and tradition. It is
also more salient in light of the present divisions in the country over the removal of
monuments, historical names, and symbols.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Detroit, Michigan, locals and tourists enjoy a large bronze-cast sculpture of a giant
man holding a family in one hand, and an orb in the other. 1 The orb represents God and
all things spiritual, the divine influence over man and his affairs; the family represents
human relationships.2 The sculpture was commissioned by the Detroit-Wayne Building
Authority in 1955.3 It is old, but not ancient. The artist was a renowned sculptor whose
work appears around the globe. He named his work “The “Spirit of Liberty,” taken from
the New Testament scripture quoted on the marble wall behind the statue.4 At its unveiling,
city officials dubbed the sculpture “The Spirit of Detroit,” its official name today. 5 The

1. The family consists of a man, woman, and child. The artist had the bronze statue rubbed in acid to
accelerate the aging process, turning it green. See Spirit of Detroit, DETROIT HIST. SOC’Y,
https://detroithistorical.org/learn/encyclopedia-of-detroit/spirit-detroit (last visited July 4, 2020); see Appendix
for image.
2. See Spirit of Detroit, supra note 1.
3. See id.
4. 2 Corinthians 3:17 (“Now the Lord is that Spirit, and where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.”).
5. See Branden Hunter, Spirit of Detroit Statue Celebrates 60 Years, MICH. CHRON. (Sept. 23, 2018),
https://michiganchronicle.com/2018/09/23/spirit-of-detroit-statue-celebrates-60years/#/?playlistId=0&videoId=0.
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statue is large, some forty-feet high—an imposing feature of the downtown Detroit
landscape. Because of its green patina, it is sometimes referred to as the “green giant.” At
the time that the statue was commissioned, city officials wanted a sculpture that would
capture the city’s intangible attributes. In designing the statue, the artist invited thirty
religious leaders to examine the proposed sculpture and opine whether the orb would be
considered an acceptable reference to the deity within their respective traditions. 6 In its
current use, the giant sometimes dons the jerseys of local sports teams when they make
the playoffs.
What is the constitutional status of monuments like the Spirit of Detroit? Before the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in American Legion v. American Humanists Association,7
a case involving an Establishment Clause challenge to a World War I memorial cross on
public land, that question would have been a close one. But American Legion makes clear
that the Spirit of Detroit and other monuments like it, conceived long ago as the product
of both religious and secular imagination, with no apparent exclusionary motive in the past
and secular use in the present, do not violate the Establishment Clause. American Legion
upholds the constitutionality of the World War I memorial cross, but Justice Alito’s
majority opinion is not limited to war memorials, crosses, or Christian symbols. Instead,
the opinion states broad propositions that apply to “religiously expressive monuments,
symbols, and practices.”8 American Legion adds another case to the Court’s recent line of
accommodationist Religion Clause decisions.9
American Legion provides a framework for determining whether a symbol violates
the Establishment Clause. Longstanding symbols, that case teaches, carry a presumption
of constitutionality when they have become embedded within the community and are
associated with purposes that are not exclusively religious.10 This presumption in favor of
longstanding monuments can be overcome only with a showing of religious animus or a
specific intent to promote religion for religion’s sake.11 This aspect of the holding
reinforces the distinction between the older Ten Commandments monument upheld in Van
Orden v. Perry and the newer display struck down in McCreary County v. ACLU, and
turns that distinction into a presumption. (More on that later, see infra pt. III.). It follows
a trend of requiring an intent to harm before finding a violation of the Establishment
Clause. In addition, American Legion relies heavily on diffuse meaning and the disruption
caused by tearing down historical monuments and symbols. These explanations respond

6. At the unveiling of the statue, a Protestant minister, a Catholic monsignor, and a rabbi each offered a
prayer. For a short, contemporaneous film on the creation of the monument and its dedication, see The Spirit of
(July
8,
2016),
Detroit
(1959),
YOUTUBE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=804&v=nTizpBHrMqs&feature=emb_logo.
7. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanists Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019). For an image of the statue at issue in this
case, see infra p. 277.
8. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2085.
9. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014); Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S.
Ct. 2012 (2017); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). During
the October 2019 term, the Court decided Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020), and
Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrisey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
10. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2085.
11. Id. at 2089.
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directly to older, separationist decisions.12 The American Legion plurality dismisses the
Lemon test in this area, and levels harsh criticism of that test just short of overruling it. 13
With a few qualifications, it can be said that American Legion is a landmark
Establishment Clause decision bringing the Court’s current approach under that Clause
much closer to a history and tradition-based doctrine. No more will lower courts be in the
business of invalidating longstanding religious symbols or monuments. Future cases
challenging “In God We Trust” on the coinage and religious imagery on county seals, for
example, are not likely to be won. American Legion marks out a modest role for the
Establishment Clause going forward. At the same time, it marks the end of a sometimes
successful and often influential litigation campaign to remove longstanding religious
symbolism, language, and monuments from the public square.
American Legion does not hold that plaintiffs challenging religious symbols lack
standing to sue under the Establishment Clause. While it leans on history and tradition, the
opinion in American Legion is decidedly not originalist in either its method or aspirations.
Justice Thomas, on the other hand, followed a historical approach that would foreclose all
such Establishment Clause challenges. Justice Gorsuch, together with Justice Thomas,
would have ruled against the American Humanist Association on justiciability grounds.
By contrast, the majority signals support for Religion Clause values and does not presume
to foreclose such lawsuits altogether. Instead, the opinion sets the rules of engagement
going forward by narrowing significantly the range of considerations.
Likewise, the American Legion majority opinion does not make a robust case for
accommodation of religion under the Establishment Clause. This was a missed opportunity
to articulate the basis for the Court’s decision beyond just a correction of past decisions.
A fully articulated theory of accommodation would eliminate any lingering confusion in
the lower courts about the proper standard to apply in Establishment Clause cases. It would
begin to undo the effects of past decisions which may have created the impression that
religious symbols and monuments are inherently suspect.
Nonetheless, the decision itself contains some observations about religion that
certainly support an accommodationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause. The
majority opinion also is informed by the history of Establishment Clause litigation
featuring arguments about the offense given by religious symbols. Perhaps for that reason,
American Legion was not the best vehicle for articulating a robust vision of
accommodation. It is also likely that the conservative and liberal justices in the majority
could not agree on the sort of propositions that would form the basis of a theory of
accommodation.14 The 7-2 decision reflects a consensus with only a few, amicable
12. See, e.g., Lisa Shaw Roy, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: Monuments, Messages, and the Next
Establishment
Clause,
NW.
L.
REV.
COLLOQUY
(2010),
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/nulr_online/201 (explaining government speech decision in
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum in light of Establishment Clause decisions).
13. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2080–82.
14. Consider, for example, Justice Alito’s answer to a question about writing opinions in cases in which the
justices are divided: “ . . . [I]f the Court is not entirely of one mind, not just on the results but on the reasoning,
there is the problem if you’re drafting a majority opinion, of writing something that will get five votes, six votes,
seven votes, whatever the number is. There may be certain things that you can’t say and certain things that you
have to put in a particular way. You have to think about not just what you would like to say if you were writing
just for yourself, but what the majority as a group wants to say.” THE SUPREME COURT: A C-SPAN BOOK
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fractures in the majority.15 Ironically, it was one of the liberal justices, Justice Breyer, who
hinted at just such a theory of accommodation during oral argument, and he used it to
justify an age-based approach that would immunize old monuments but not new ones. 16
Part II of this article situates American Legion within the history of Establishment
Clause litigation, particularly in the area of symbols. Part III parses the decision in
American Legion and applies it to recent controversies. Part IV evaluates the approach
taken in American Legion and argues that a fully-articulated principal of accommodation
best supports religious liberty.
II.

THE OLD REGIME: MONEY, PRAYER, AND RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS

A. Funding Cases
The Court’s twentieth century separationist Establishment Clause decisions tended
to take a dim view of organized religion. In the Court’s telling, religion was strong in its
authoritarian ambitions, yet weak in its tendency to succumb to government attempts to
corrupt it. In the funding decisions, religion tended to win only if the state could separate
its goals, priorities, and funding decisions from the most religious or “sectarian” aspects
of religious schools. Religion often was characterized in those decisions as tending to
divide citizens and fuel persecution of minorities.
The Establishment Clause doctrine that began in 1947 with Everson v. Board of
Education17 created the mold for discussing religion in terms of the history of religious
persecution. In Everson the Court upheld a bus transportation reimbursement program for
students attending private religious schools, but the majority and dissent agreed on the
principles of separation. Because the benefit in that case was reimbursement to parents of
transportation payments that merely helped the children get to school, the state’s
reimbursement did not breach Jefferson’s wall of separation. For the Everson majority, the
history it recounted, and the principles of separation derived from that history, did not
require the Court to strike down the bus transportation payments. Though the wall of
separation must be kept “high and impregnable,” the Everson majority set limits on what
can be taken from religion in the name of nonestablishment: for a State “cannot hamper
its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude
individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Nonbelievers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack
of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.”18 Notice Justice Black’s
language: individual Catholics, individual Lutherans, and so on. Excluding individual
believers would go too far and repeat the same mistake. Religion in general, perhaps
FEATURING THE JUSTICES IN THEIR OWN WORDS 156 (Brian Lamb, Susan Swain & Mark Farkas eds., 2010)
(Interview with Justice Samuel Alito).
15. Justice Kagan did not join in the plurality’s description of the failures of the Lemon test or its discussion
of Town of Greece’s historical approach to the Establishment Clause. See American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2080–
82, 2087–89 (plurality opinion, Parts II.A (failures of Lemon) and II.D. (Town of Greece)). Justice Kagan refused
to join Part II.D. “out of perhaps an excess of caution,” but praised the tone of the plurality nonetheless. Id. at
2094 (Kagan, J., concurring).
16. See infra discussion in Part IV.A.
17. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
18. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
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institutional religion, on the other hand, would be kept safely behind the wall.
Everson and later opinions vividly described religious persecution in the eighteenth
century, but, as some have noted, the litigants and the Justices were more likely to have
been influenced by the religious conflicts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries in which they lived.19 Early twentieth century church-state battles involved
fights between Protestants and Catholics over funding for Catholic schools. As the
Catholic presence in public schools increased, Catholic children were subjected to
Protestant prayers and Bible reading which conflicted with their beliefs. Catholics wanted
their own schools to preserve the transmission of the faith to their children. 20 Various
Protestant groups, on the other hand, viewed Catholics as a threat to the dominant
Protestant consensus who would shelter a generation from inculcation in the “American”
way of life. The Protestant groups who sued to prevent Catholics from obtaining public
funds clung to the separation of church and state as an almost religious ideal. Much of the
rhetoric employed to denounce Catholics’ pursuit of school funding sounded in rank
bigotry that would offend American sensibilities today.21
Secularists joined Protestants in their opposition to funding for Catholic schools.
The secularists who challenged Catholics’ pursuit of funds also championed separation as
a means to prevent religion from gaining dominance over the secular aspects of public life.
Secularists perceived a rival system of religious schools as a threat to the public schools.22
Philip Hamburger’s work on the origins of the idea of separation of church and state
include nativists like the Klu Klux Clan, as well as the Masons, in the varied groups that
opposed public funding for Catholic schools.23 Jewish groups also opposed public funds
for religious schools in those years and would play a larger role in later Establishment
Clause challenges.24 The funding cases carry the baggage of anti-Catholicism; even some
of the opinions of the Justices feed on the anti-Catholic rhetoric and stereotypes of the
era.25 Within the separationist coalition, however, Jewish groups’ advocacy could be
19. See, e.g., DONALD DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT 79–82 (2010) (quoting Justice
Rutledge’s memo after the conference in Everson: “We all know that this [law] is really a fight by Catholic
schools to secure this money from the public treasury. It is aggressive and on a wide scale.”)
20. Much of this history is recounted in John C. Jeffries, Jr., & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the
Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279 (2001–2002).
21. Justice Alito’s concurrence in Espinoza covers this well-known ground. See Espinoza, 591 S. Ct. at 2269–
74 (Alito, J., concurring). On the influence of anti-Catholicism on the Justices during the Everson era, see Justice
Thomas’s discussion of Justice Hugo Black in his separate Espinoza concurrence. See Espinoza, 591 S. Ct. at
2266 (Thomas, J., concurring).
22. For one example, see Note, Catholic Schools and Public Money, 50 YALE L.J. 917, 927 (1941) (“The
neighborhood common school, cutting across the lines of class, sect, race, and ability is a fundamental ideal of
democratic society not lightly to be abandoned. A regard for the American constitutional principle of religious
liberty has for a hundred years exacted of that ideal a sacrifice, and four million Catholic children are free to
forsake the public school for the classrooms of their church.”)
23. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002).
24. HAMBURGER, supra note 23, at 391–96; SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW 58 (2010)
(“Given the importance of Jews and Jewish organizations to the law of religion in the 1960s and beyond, these
first conflicts are remarkable for the relative lack of Jewish voices.”)
25. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829 (2000) (Thomas, J., plurality) (discussing the “pervasively
sectarian” distinction) (“This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried now.”); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 251 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting) (referring to advocates for textbook loan program as “the same
powerful sectarian religious propagandists” who would seek “complete domination and supremacy of their
particular brand of religion”); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 635–36 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also
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understood as something other than religious bigotry.26 As Jeffries and Ryan put it in their
article covering the contemporaneous history of Everson and later cases: “Their
prominence in these debates sprang not only from their position in society and from their
commitment to the issue, but also from the special weight given Jewish views on religious
freedom in the aftermath of the Holocaust.” 27
Beginning with Everson and growing in later years, federal challenges to parochial
school funding programs provided a series of cases for decision by the Supreme Court. In
turn, the Court’s funding docket yielded a haphazard array of decisions that could best be
explained by their specific facts—bus rides, books, teacher salaries, building grants—
rather than the larger principles of separation or neutrality, likely reflecting the priorities
and incremental litigation agendas of the groups involved in those cases. At the same time,
the Justices were struggling to find a unifying principle for the Court’s growing body of
Establishment Clause decisions. Within an area that was often confused and incoherent,
the funding cases became a prime example of the Establishment Clause’s doctrinal morass.
The Court’s decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman,28 setting forth a test for Establishment Clause
cases, became the symbol for the Court’s separationist funding decisions and the
subsequent criticisms of the Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine.
The separationist decisions of that era, viewed in hindsight with a contemporary
focus on the implications for religious groups, have a twin legacy of anti-Catholicism and
a concern for the plight of religious minorities.29 Strict separationism in the funding cases
also served another purpose. In the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education, the Court’s
Establishment Clause decisions limited the extent to which government funds could flow
to segregated schools.30
B. School Prayer
In the term following Everson, the Court struck down a release time program in
which the Illinois public schools permitted children to leave classes to receive religious
instruction on campus.31 The program itself included instruction from Protestant, Catholic,
and Jewish religious leaders. The challenger in that case was Vashti McCollum, an
agnostic who opposed all religious references in schools. In a short opinion by Justice
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2267 (Thomas, J., concurring).
26. See, e.g., GREGORY IVERS, TO BUILD A WALL: AMERICAN JEWS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE (1995).
27. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 20, at 307–08.
28. See Lemon, 403 U.S. 602.
29. See, e.g., Thomas J. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
121, 163 (2001):
The stricter separationism of these decades therefore reflected a general distrust of any majority
position on matters of religion, not simply a distrust of Catholicism (which sometimes was, but
sometimes was not, a majority faith). The 1960s and 1970s separationism reflected a desire to protect
minority faiths from the majority’s power—a position that, at least for the Warren Court, coincided
with the Court’s overall concern for protecting minorities.
30. See Douglas Laycock, Why the Supreme Court Changed Its Mind About Government Aid to Religious
Institutions: It’s A Lot More Than Just Republican Appointments, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 275, 285–86 (2008); see
also Lemon, 403 U.S. 602 (disposing of plaintiff Alton Lemon’s equal protection claim alleging race
discrimination by private religious schools).
31. Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Ed., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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Black, and a concurrence by Justice Frankfurter, the Court accepted McCollum’s
challenge as required by the absolute separation of church and state.32 Although the Court
would later allow off-campus release time programs in an accommodationist decision that
was rare for that era,33 McCollum paved the way for the Court’s school prayer decisions
several years later.34
The earliest challenges to prayer and Bible reading in public school were brought
under state constitutional provisions.35 Students and their parents challenged the
Protestant character of prayer and Bible reading in public schools as a violation of their
religious freedom. Early cases striking down prayer practices noted that Catholic parents
were required to support with their taxes public school education that included readings
from the King James rather than the Douay versions of the Bible. 36 After incorporation of
the Establishment Clause against the States in Everson in 1947, secularists and others sued
to end prayer and Bible reading in various states. One such challenge to prayer and Bible
reading reached the Court in the early 1950s, but the Court held that the taxpayer
challenger lacked standing.37
When the issue of public school prayer finally reached the Court in Engel v. Vitale,38
the Court struck down a state-composed Regents prayer, and much of the country reacted
strongly in opposition to the decision. Engel revealed a sharp division between popular
and elite opinion, with elites, including some religious leaders, giving the decision modest
praise. Notable among religious leaders who expressed support for the Court’s ruling was
the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.39 After the Engel decision and in response to both
Engel and the case striking down prayer and Bible reading in the following term, School
District of Abington v. Schempp,40 religious leaders and lawmakers failed in several
attempts to obtain a constitutional amendment backing school prayer.
The prayer cases represented the culmination of separationists’ litigation agenda up
to that point, minus one important part of the funding coalition—Protestants. Protestant
groups such as Protestants and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church and

32. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 211; Id. at 231–32 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
33. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (“We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose
a Supreme Being.”); see also, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1962) (Sunday closing laws do not
violate the Establishment Clause); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding property tax
exemption for churches) (decided the term before Lemon).
34. In deciding whether to file an amicus brief in the McCollum case, there was some trepidation on the part
of Jewish groups who did not want to be associated with McCollum’s atheism or statements in her brief that
religion “is the opiate of the masses.” See IVERS, supra note 26, at 75–77.
35. See, e.g., Herold v. Parish Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 68 So. 116 (La. 1915); Church v. Bullock, 109 S. W. 115
(Tex. 1908).
36. See, e.g., People ex rel. Ring v. Bd. of Educ., 92 N.E. 251 (Ill. 1910).
37. Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
38. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
39. See Address Delivered to the National Press Club and Question and Answer Period, THE PAPERS OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., vol. VIII (Jan. 1961–Dec. 1962) (answering a question about the school prayer
decision in Engel) (“I know that this decision has received a great deal of criticism. I would say simply that this
decision was a sound and good decision reaffirming something that is basic in our constitution, namely separation
of church and state.”). Though beyond the scope of this article, King’s praise of the decision might be explained
on the ground that maintaining the institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court was critical to the larger goal
of achieving civil rights through the courts.
40. Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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State (“POAU”) (later known as Americans United for the Separation of Church and State)
perceived a threat from the prospect of separate Catholic schools, but generally did not
object to largely Protestant practices in the public school. Over time, the Protestant
separationist groups came to accept the school prayer decisions as consistent with, and
perhaps even required by, the principles of separation.41 The prayer cases were fully
consistent with the aims of atheists, agnostics, and other individuals who objected to
religious observances in public schools. Justice Stewart dissented in Engel and Schempp.
He worried that the Court’s “mechanistic” invocation of the separation principle was
unfaithful to the entirety of the Religion Clauses, including free exercise, but Stewart was
a lone voice in the wilderness.42 With few exceptions at the Court, the separation principle
was in full swing, particularly after the Court’s decision in Lemon.43 These results likely
reflected the Court’s composition as well as the sophistication of the separationists’
litigation efforts.44
School prayer consumed the energies of lawmakers, but not the Court again, until
the 1993 graduation prayer case, Lee v. Weisman. In Lee, the Court held that a middle
school policy of clergy-led prayer coerced non-participating students in violation of the
Establishment Clause.45 The Court’s school prayer cases were decided under the
Establishment Clause, but those cases can be justified on free exercise grounds.46
The school prayer cases did not control the outcome of the Court’s decision
upholding state legislative prayer in Marsh v. Chambers.47 As support, the majority in
Marsh pointed to the Continental Congress’s approval of the Congressional chaplaincy

41. See GORDON, supra note 24, at 84–86; HAMBURGER, supra note 23, at 476–78. According to Hamburger,
the Baptists represented by the Baptist Joint Committee were at best ambivalent about all of the implications of
separation, but eventually came to align with and accept the more secular version of separation advanced by the
atheist and agnostic wing of the coalition for separation. See HAMBURGER, supra, note 23, at 476–78.
42. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). The conference notes from Murray v. Curlett suggest that Justice Stewart would have undone Engel
to allow for school prayer from many religious traditions (“I am inclined to remand [Schempp and Murray] so
that the states can give every sect a chance to have religious exercises in schools—including atheists.”). THE
SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS 426 (Del Dickson ed., 2001).
43. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the School Prayer
Decisions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 945, 992–96 (2011).
44. See, e.g., FRANK J. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF CHURCH
AND STATE 204 (1976) (surveying church-state litigation from 1951–1971) (discussing the accommodationist
response) (“ . . . In general there was nothing approaching the interest group division of effort—the “system”—
one could find in the separationist camp. As a result of all of this, the battle over church-state issues in American
courts was a very unequal one.”). For a discussion of accommodationist litigation during that period, see Angela
C. Carmella, Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion Clauses and Political-Legal Compromise, 120 W. VA.
L. REV 1 (2017).
45. See also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding prayer at football game policy
unconstitutional).
46. Cf., e.g., Paul G. Kauper, The Warren Court: Religious Liberty and Church-State Relations, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 269, 283 (1968) (“It seems clear that prayer and Bible-reading practices have been held invalid not simply
because they violate the neutrality principle but because this particular breach of neutrality has involved the states
so deeply in religious matters as to have a coercive effect on the liberty of dissenters and nonconformists.
Schempp can thus be viewed as a case protecting the freedom of the minority.”).
47. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); cf., e.g., Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 590 (distinguishing
Lee v. Weisman from prayer before town board on the basis of students’ age and impressionability).
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and the tradition in Congress and in state legislatures ever since. 48 The Court reaffirmed
Marsh in Town of Greece v. Galloway, a case involving a rotating volunteer chaplaincy
that led prayer before town board meetings.49 Town of Greece resolved sub-issues that had
been the subject of litigation in the years following Marsh, and importantly, refocused the
Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine on history.50 In many ways, Town of Greece laid
the groundwork for the Court’s decision in American Legion.51
In the thirty years between its legislative prayer decisions in Marsh and Town of
Greece, the Court decided a number of cases involving symbols and monuments.
C. Ceremonies, Traditions, and Religious Symbols
In the early days of separationist litigation, challenges to cultural references to God,
or what is often referred to as ceremonial deism, such as “In God We Trust” on the coinage
or “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, enjoyed the least success in the courts.
Lawsuits challenging ceremonial deism also tended to be dismissed as reflecting the
concerns of the “lone agnostic” or the “the atheist curmudgeon.”52
Within the professional separationist groups, few showed early interest in bringing
such lawsuits. One of the leading Protestant separationist groups, POAU, focused largely
on funding challenges involving the Catholic Church. During the 1950s, when “under
God” was added to the Pledge and “In God We Trust” was identified as the National Motto,
the American Civil Liberties Union reportedly was not interested in the “religion area.”53
Likewise, dominant players such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the American
Jewish Congress apparently did not want to tarnish the principle of separation or
jeopardize their success with even less popular causes than challenges to parochial school
funding and prayer.54 Leo Pfeffer, the famed American Jewish Congress attorney who
won several Establishment Clause cases in the Supreme Court, distanced himself and his
work from atheist Madeline Murray’s activities, including a challenge to the words “So
help me God” in judicial oaths, referring to her as “evangelical” and on a “crusade against
God.”55 Similarly, a 1975 Baptist Joint Committee publication warned its donors about
48. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787–89.
49. See generally Town of Greece, 572 U.S. 565.
50. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576.
51. See, e.g., Lisa Shaw Roy, The Unexplored Implications of Town of Greece v. Galloway, 80 ALB. L. REV.
877 (2017) (applying legislative prayer decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway to a hypothetical future case
involving a religious symbol).
52. See NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND WHAT WE SHOULD
DO ABOUT IT 182–85 (2005).
53. KEVIN M. KRUSE, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: HOW CORPORATE AMERICA INVENTED CHRISTIAN
AMERICA 122–23 (2015). Later Kruse notes that “Protestants, Catholics, and Jews had all played a part” in
the changes to the Pledge and the National Motto, as had “members of both political parties from
across the ideological spectrum.” Id. at 124.
54. See SORAUF, supra note 44, at 104 (referring to POAU, the ACLU, and the AJC) (“None was willing,
despite the pleas of would-be plaintiffs, to test references to the Deity in the national motto or the pledge of
allegiance to the flag.”) The issue of “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance finally reached the Court through
litigation by Plaintiff Michael Newdow in Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (disposing
of the case on standing grounds).
55. Leo Pfeffer, The Deity in American Constitutional History, in JAMES E. WOOD, JR., ED., RELIGION AND
THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER 140–41 (1985). Madeline Murray, whose repeated lawsuits
attracted much negative attention, also gained allies through her notoriety and made a living by contributions
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rumors of Murray’s activities.56
According to Frank Sorauf, a social scientist writing in the late 1970s, the national
ACLU had not prioritized church-state litigation for over a decade; instead it allowed the
local affiliates to find and seek permission to bring Establishment Clause cases.57 Two
such cases reached the Court in the 1980s: Lynch v. Donelly and County of Allegheny v.
ACLU.58
i. Symbols in the Supreme Court
In Lynch, a majority of the Court upheld the constitutionality of a city’s display of a
crèche along with several other figures including carolers, reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh,
a large Christmas tree, a Santa’s house, and a banner with the words “Season’s
Greetings.”59 For the majority, the crèche represented a passive reminder of the
celebration of Christmas and the nation’s religious past and present. Justice O’Connor
joined the majority upholding the city’s crèche, but she wrote separately to apply her noendorsement test. In her view, the crèche in Lynch did not send an endorsement message
because of its context in the “overall holiday setting” of the display.60
Lemon was the most commonly used doctrinal rubric at the time, but it led to
unpredictable results.61 Justice O’Connor offered the endorsement test as an improvement:
endorsement would refine Lemon to focus on the most important, even if subtle, ways that
the government might violate the Establishment Clause. Although the term “endorsement”
had been used by the Supreme Court on several occasions, Justice O’Connor’s concept of
endorsement was novel because it defined establishment in terms of expressive harm to
nonadherents: “Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of the political community.”62 She later explained that
the perspective to be employed with the endorsement test is that of a hypothetical
“reasonable observer” who is familiar with the history and context of the government’s
actions.63
A majority of the Court adopted Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test in County of

from donors sympathetic to her cause. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. MURRAY, MY LIFE WITHOUT GOD 97–98 (2012)
(Murray’s son and plaintiff in Murray v. Curlett, the companion case to Schempp). Murray founded American
Atheists. Id.
56. BAPTIST JOINT COMM., “REPORT FROM THE CAPITAL,” 75TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION 8 (2011) (quoting
a 1975 report by the BJC General Counsel) (available at http://bjconline.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/75thRFTC_Final-Version.pdf (last visited July 13, 2020)).
57. SORAUF, supra note 44, at 36–37.
58. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). Both
cases involved local ACLU affiliates.
59. Lynch, 465 U.S. 688. And a talking wishing well!
60. Id. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
61. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602.
62. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). As she explained it, “[d]isapproval sends the opposite
message.” Id. For support, Justice O’Connor cited one of the school prayer cases, and implicit in those cases are
concerns about religious minorities. See, e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S. 203.
63. Capitol Square Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780–82 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). As the
arbiter of endorsement, the reasonable observer’s perception is informed by “the history and context of the
community . . . in which the religious display appears.” Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780–82 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Allegheny v. ACLU, a case involving a crèche inside a county courthouse and a Hanukkah
menorah next to a Christmas tree on the steps of a city-county building.64 In a fractured
decision, a majority found the crèche in the courthouse unconstitutional, with Justices
O’Connor and Blackmun joining the crèche dissenters to uphold the menorah.65 The Court
praised Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test as a “sound analytical framework for
evaluating governmental use of religious symbols.”66 The Court interpreted O’Connor’s
Lynch endorsement analysis to depend on the physical setting of the display and the
presence and proximity of secular symbols.67 Applying that analysis, the Court invalidated
the crèche because it was not surrounded by any other symbols that would detract from its
religious message.68 Justice Kennedy dissented from the crèche holding with an extended
critique of the endorsement test.69 He would have upheld the constitutionality of both
displays under a coercion test.70 The no-endorsement purists, on the other hand, missed
the opportunity to recognize the pluralism reflected in the large menorah next to the
Christmas tree.
Taken together, Lynch and County of Allegheny made the application of the
endorsement test in religious symbols cases heavily dependent on context. Lower courts
applied this fact-intensive inquiry to cases involving religious holiday displays, city and
county seals, monuments, and crosses, with a dizzying array of results.71 For challengers,
cases that were at the fringes now were far more likely to be won, particularly in the lower
courts.72 Here, too, concerns about religious minorities were often at the forefront. Judges
who addressed the issue felt obliged to point out their sensitivity to the fact that members
of minority religions may be offended by Christian symbols. 73
64. Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 595.
67. Id. at 596.
68. Id. at 598.
69. Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 660 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
70. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
71. Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, 565 U.S. 994 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (discussing disparate results in lower courts); see also Smith, supra note 43, at 1004.
72. Compare, e.g., symbol cases prior to Lynch and Cty. of Allegheny: Citizens Concerned for Separation of
Church & State v. City & Cty. of Denver, 481 F. Supp. 522, 529 (D. Colo. 1979) (struck down creche near city
hall); Fox v. City of L.A., 22 Cal. 3d 792 (1978) (struck down illumination of cross through windows on city
hall for Christmas and Easter holidays); Lowe v. City of Eugene, 451 P.2d 117 (Or. 1969) (struck down cross in
hilltop park); Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 558 P.2d 338 (Or. 1976) (upheld same cross after
designated as a war memorial); Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973) (upheld Ten
Commandments monument near courthouse); Meyer v. Okla. City, 496 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1972) (upheld fifty-ft
cross at public fairgrounds); Paul v. Dade Cty., 202 So. 2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (upheld lights in the
shape of a cross on courthouse); Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upheld inclusion of creche in
national Pageant of Peace); Lawrence v. Buchmueller, 243 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1963) (upheld creche on school
grounds).
73. One dissenting district judge in a symbols case explained his reasoning with respect to the groups he
believed to be most affected by the decision:
It would not worry me unduly if a “fastidious atheist or agnostic” found the City of Birmingham’s
nativity scene offensive on aesthetic or philosophical grounds, or if a modern day Puritan objected to
it on religious grounds. I might be able to sympathize with such a point of view, but I would consider
it largely irrelevant from a legal standpoint; not everything that gives offense in this world is
unconstitutional. The situation of Birmingham’s Jewish citizens, however, calls for special comment;
if anyone has a legitimate basis for objecting to the nativity scene, it is they. (It may be appropriate to
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ii. Age and Divisiveness
The next religious monument cases, McCreary and Van Orden, involved public
display of the Ten Commandments.74 What developed from those cases was another
pairing, with one monolith upheld and the other display struck down. In McCreary, a
majority of the Court avoided use of the endorsement test in favor of Lemon’s purpose
prong, albeit through the lens of the reasonable observer, to strike down a relatively recent
posting of the Ten Commandments in a county courthouse. 75 By contrast, the Ten
Commandments monument outside the Texas capitol in Van Orden had existed for forty
years without challenge. A plurality upholding the monument did not apply the Lemon or
endorsement tests but relied on the nation’s history of acknowledgement of religion and
the Ten Commandment’s place within that history.76
Justice Breyer, the decisive vote in both cases, concurred in the result in Van Orden
but did not confine his analysis to any particular test; rather, he found the case to be a
borderline one in which no particular test could substitute for the exercise of “legal
judgment.”77 Justice Breyer justified his vote as an effort to avoid the religious
divisiveness that might result from a ruling to dismantle the monument. 78 This represents
an inversion of an assumption underlying the success of the replacement campaign—that
removal of a religious symbol is required to achieve civil peace. The argument reflects a
pragmatism about current realities that can be difficult to ignore. Even for those who,
presumably like Justice Breyer in some cases, believe that public display of religious
symbolism borders on establishment, to dismantle the old could disturb the fragile
consensus that exists in favor of the current state of affairs. 79
In a later case involving a Latin cross in the desert, a plurality of justices echoed this
view. Salazar involved a government land transfer to preserve a Latin cross that served as
a war memorial.80 The plurality’s discussion in Salazar previews the decision in American
Legion. The plurality directed the district court to consider whether the land transfer to
preserve the cross in private hands could be deemed a policy of accommodation to avoid
note, at this point, that there is no Jewish plaintiff in this case.)… I understand that concern, and am
less certain of the correctness of my position in this case because of it. When I examine the “social
facts” as dispassionately as I can, however, and try to apply the law I am sworn to uphold as I am
given to understand it, I cannot find any constitutional infirmity in what the city has done. I see no
anti-Jewish animus in Birmingham’s observance of Christmas, and I know of no basis for any claim
that the federal courts are empowered, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, to prohibit
Birmingham from observing Christmas in any manner reasonably appropriate to the season.
ACLU v. Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561, 1572 (6th Cir. 1986) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
74. McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
75. McCreary followed an earlier case, Stone v. Graham, a per curiam opinion striking down the posting of
the Ten Commandments in a schoolhouse under Lemon. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
76. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 687–92.
77. Id. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I see no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgement [in
this sensitive area]”). Some lower courts have referred to Justice Breyer’s concurrence as the legal judgment test.
78. Id. at 699, 704 (Breyer, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 699, 704 (Breyer, J., concurring); but see Andrew Koppelman, The New American Civil Religion:
Lessons for Italy, 41 GEO. WASH. INTL. L. REV. 861, 866 (2010) (arguing an alternative rationale, that “[n]ew
sponsorship of religious practices is far more likely to represent a contemporaneous effort to intervene in a live
religious controversy than the perpetuation of old forms.”).
80. Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010). Because of the procedural posture of the case, the Court did not
decide the merits of the constitutionality of the cross on federal land.
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the divisive spectacle of dismantling the cross.81 The existence of a secular purpose82 and
the passage of a significant amount of time83 also mattered. Salazar was the last memorial
cross case to reach the Court before American Legion, though others attracted the Justices’
attention.84 By the time American Legion was decided, cases involving symbols and
monuments represented a significant number of cases in the lower courts.
III. THE NEW REGIME: MONUMENTS, SYMBOLS, AND PRACTICES
A. American Legion v. American Humanists Association
In 1925, residents of Prince George’s County, Maryland erected the Bladensburg
Peace Cross to commemorate the area’s World War I veterans who died overseas. The
monument consists of a thirty-two-foot high Latin cross inscribed with the names of fortynine men who died in the war, the American Legion symbol, and the words: Valor,
Endurance, Courage, and Devotion.85 The cross sits in the middle of an intersection in the
town of Bladensburg, roughly seven miles from Washington, D.C. Since 1960, the cross
has been maintained by the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission.86
In 2012 the American Humanist Association sued to remove the cross on the basis of the
county’s ownership, maintenance, and display of the cross on public land. 87 The district
court ruled against the American Humanist Association on summary judgment, but the
Fourth Circuit found that the cross endorsed Christianity in violation of the Establishment
Clause.88
Justice Alito authored a majority opinion for five Justices—himself, Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Kavanaugh, and notably, Justices Breyer and Kagan—upholding the
constitutionality of the Bladensburg Cross. In two subsections of the opinion, a plurality
of the Court, minus Justice Kagan, addressed the weaknesses of the Lemon test, and the
merits of the historical approach in Town of Greece.89 Justice Kagan authored a
concurrence explaining her decision not to join the plurality; she joined Justice Breyer’s
concurrence applying a fact-intensive approach to new monuments. Justice Kavanaugh
81. At one point in the litigation, the cross was covered with a plywood box to comply with the district court’s
order of removal. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007).
82. Salazar, 599 U.S. at 715 (plurality opinion) (“Although certainly a Christian symbol, the cross was not
emplaced on Sunrise Rock to promote a Christian message.”).
83. Id. at 716 (plurality opinion) (“Time also has played a role. The cross had stood on Sunrise Rock for
nearly seven decades before the statute was enacted. By then, the cross and the cause it commemorated had
become entwined in the public consciousness.”).
84. See, e.g., Mt. Soledad Memorial Ass’n v. Trunk, 567 U.S. 944 (2012) (statement of Alito, J., respecting
the denial of certiorari); Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n, 565 U.S. 994 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
85. The plaque containing the names of soldiers states that the monument is “[d]edicated to the heroes of
Prince George’s County, Maryland who lost their lives in the Great War for the liberty of the world.” Am. Legion,
139 S. Ct. at 2077. The plaque also contains a quote from Woodrow Wilson’s request for a declaration of war:
“The right is more precious than peace. We shall fight for the things we have always carried nearest our hearts.
To such a task we dedicate our lives.” Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2078. As an alternative to removal, the American Humanist Association suggested that the court
could order the Cross’s arms be removed to create an obelisk. Id.
88. Id. at 2079.
89. Id. at 2080–82, 2087–89 (plurality opinion, Parts II.A. and II.D.).
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joined the majority opinion in full, but wrote separately to criticize Lemon and substitute
a categorical approach to Establishment Clause cases. Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence
focused on state and local governments’ ability to respond to citizens’ objections to
monuments. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, advocating a historical approach
to the Establishment Clause that “resists incorporation” against the states.90 Justice
Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, would have disposed of the case on standing
grounds.91 Justice Ginsburg authored a dissent joined by Justice Sotomayor.92
i. The Court Confronts Lemon
Justice Alito’s opinion for the majority described the history of the monument, from
the 1918 fundraising campaign to erect it and its use over the years as the site of veterans’
rallies, to its current status as a familiar landmark for local residents. 93 The Court also
discussed the history of the cross as a symbol for the Swiss, and the Latin cross, in
particular, as a war memorial.94 Much of this was reminiscent of Salazar v. Buono, but in
American Legion, the Court was prepared to end the campaign of lawsuits against
longstanding religious monuments.95 A plurality of the Justices, excluding Justice Kagan,
explained why Lemon and the endorsement test have not aged well, particularly in the area
of symbols. Instead of applying Lemon, both the plurality and the Court set forth a
presumption of constitutionality for longstanding “religiously expressive monuments,
symbols, and practices.”96 Justices Thomas and Gorsuch wrote concurrences supporting
the plurality’s repudiation of Lemon in symbols cases.97 Justice Kagan wrote a separate
concurrence holding onto Lemon, which she believed could be applied to reach the same
decision in the case.98 The opinion, like Town of Greece, rejects the view that the Christian
nature of the cross itself is exclusionary.99
The Court offered four considerations to explain why longstanding monuments are
entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. In a later section of the opinion, the Court
applied these considerations to the Bladensburg Cross, noting that all four justified the

90. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2095 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas first advanced this view in
Newdow and has repeated it on several occasions. See, e.g., Newdow, 542 U.S. at 49–51 (Thomas, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 2098–101 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (rejecting the concept of “offended observer” standing in
symbols cases). Justice Gorsuch offered praise for the majority opinion he did not join, describing it as
“compelling.” Id. at 2098.
92. Id. at 2103–13 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 2076–78. Justice Alito has authored a growing body of religion decisions. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom
From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (taxpayer standing); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460
(2009) (permanent monuments as government speech); Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (RFRA
challenge to contraceptive mandate); Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (RLUIPA challenge to prison no-beard policy);
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067; Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (Free Exercise and Establishment Clause
ministerial exception).
94. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2074–76.
95. See id. at 2087 (“ . . . a campaign to obliterate items with religious associations may evidence hostility to
religion even if those religious associations are no longer in the forefront.”).
96. Id. at 2085.
97. Id. at 2097 (Thomas, J., concurring); Id. at 2101 (Gorsuch, J. concurring).
98. Id. at 2094 (Kagan, J., concurring) (explaining her view that Lemon’s purpose and effect prongs are
“crucial” in symbols cases).
99. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2090; see also Roy, Unexplored Implications, supra note 51.
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Court’s holding.100 First, the original purposes of a monument may be lost to time, or at
least difficult to detect.101 Second, over the years purposes can multiply; a symbol that
was once religious may take on a secular meaning in a particular community.102 Third, the
message associated with a given monument may change over time.103 With longstanding
monuments and symbols, the majority recognized the possible coexistence of both
pluralism and common culture: “As our society becomes more and more religiously
diverse, a community may preserve such monuments, symbols, and practices for the sake
of their historical significance or their place in a common cultural heritage.”104 This offers
a more nuanced view of symbols than the Court’s sometimes more rigid requirement under
Lemon that religious symbols serve a “primarily secular purpose.”105 It acknowledges that
a religious symbol may be a part of a common heritage rather than an exclusionary
intrusion into modern life.
By contrast, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent applied the no-endorsement test applied in
County of Allegheny. The dissent focused on the cross as a war memorial and the fact that
the cross is the preeminent symbol of Christianity, rather than a universal symbol of all
faiths.106 The dissent found that symbols like the Bladensburg Cross make nonadherents
into outsiders whose standing in the political community has been diminished. 107 As
possible alternatives to tearing down the monument, the dissent noted the possibility of
relocating the cross or transferring the land to private hands. 108
ii. “A government that roams the land . . .”
The Court’s fourth consideration directly addresses the replacement campaign and
the oft-noted charge that the Court’s Establishment Clause decisions reflect hostility to
religion. In the case of a longstanding monument that has taken on cultural and historical
significance, the Court agreed that removal of the monument may be viewed as hostility
to religion:
A government that roams the land, tearing down monuments with religious symbolism and
scrubbing away any reference to the divine will strike many as aggressively hostile to
religion. Militantly secular regimes have carried out such projects in the past, and for those
with a knowledge of history, the image of monuments being taken down will be evocative,
disturbing, and divisive.109

This observation marks a departure from the sweep of the Court’s symbols cases
100. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2089–90.
101. Id. at 2082.
102. Id. at 2082–83.
103. Id. at 2084. Here, the Court relied on Summum, 555 U.S. 460.
104. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2083.
105. McCreary, 545 U.S. 844, 864.
106. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2107 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This point is answered by the majority: “The
cross is undoubtedly a Christian symbol, but that fact should not blind us to everything else that the Bladensburg
Cross has come to represent.” Id. at 2090.
107. Id. at 2106 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“To non-Christians, nearly 30% of the population of the United
States . . . the State’s choice to display the cross on public buildings or spaces conveys a message of exclusion:
It tells them they ‘are outsiders, not full members of the political community.’”).
108. Id. at 2112 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2084–85.
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after Lynch. Under Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test, courts focused on the experience
of the observer who is offended by the monument. That others in the community might be
offended by the monument’s removal stands to reason, and has been noted before, but this
passage recognizes the volume and intensity of the lawsuits aimed at removing religious
monuments.110 It notes the hole in the cultural fabric once the symbol is removed, and it
contrasts our society with “militantly secular” ones, like post-revolutionary France. The
specter of removal is “evocative, disturbing, and divisive,” not just to veterans, their
families, or persons who identify with a particular religion.111
iii. The Unified and Thematic First Amendment
In American Legion, avoiding divisiveness is a theme that pervades the entire
opinion. “The Religion Clauses,” the opinion begins, “aim to foster a society in which
people of all beliefs can live together harmoniously . . . .”112 The First Amendment
embodies “the ideals of respect and tolerance.”113 Even the plurality’s historical approach
under Town of Greece is inflected with concerns about pluralism.114 Justice Alito
explained the Court’s legislative prayer decisions in Marsh and Town of Greece in terms
of the historical pedigree of the practice and the extent to which it is inclusive:
The practice begun by the First Congress stands out as an example of respect and tolerance
for differing views, an honest endeavor to achieve inclusivity and nondiscrimination, and a
recognition of the important role that religion plays in the lives of many Americans. Where
categories of monuments, symbols, and practices with a longstanding history follow in that
tradition, they are likewise constitutional.115

Justice Kagan praised this part of the plurality opinion, noting that “[there], as
elsewhere, the opinion shows sensitivity to and respect for this Nation’s pluralism, and the
values of neutrality and inclusion that the First Amendment demands.” 116
If one reads, perhaps too closely, the language of the Court’s opinion, it becomes
apparent that civic unity is not the only value. The opinion aims for a doctrinal unity and
coherence within the First Amendment. The opening description of the Court’s holding
mentions the “Religion Clauses,” not the Establishment Clause. Likewise, the closing
sentence mentions the “First Amendment.”117 The only time the Establishment Clause is
acknowledged in the Court’s opinion is in its discussion of the history of the case, and the
Court’s own precedent.118 American Legion undertakes to fix some of the problems with
the Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine, at least in the area of symbols, and from that
perspective the Court’s broader focus makes sense. The First Amendment is held in high

110. See infra discussion in Part IV.
111. See, e.g., Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2085, 2087 (“ . . . a campaign to obliterate items with religious
associations may evidence hostility to religion even if those religious associations are no longer in the
forefront.”).
112. Id. at 2074.
113. Id. at 2071, 2090.
114. Id. at 2087–88 (plurality opinion).
115. Id. at 2089 (plurality opinion).
116. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2094 (Kagan, J., concurring) (discussing Part II.D.).
117. Id. at 2079–85.
118. Id.
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regard as a bulwark of civil liberties. The Free Exercise Clause protects religious
individuals and institutions from government intrusion. Likewise, the Court’s free speech
decisions promote tolerance for disagreeable ideas. Anchoring the decision in American
Legion to the reputation of the First Amendment, rather than the Establishment Clause,
adds legitimacy to the Court’s opinion.
The Court’s Establishment Clause decisions, on the other hand, have no such
pedigree.119 An early and consistent critique of those decisions since Everson has been
that they do not take into account the Free Exercise Clause or free exercise values. At their
worst, the Court’s decisions seemed to say that the Establishment Clause is at war with the
Free Exercise Clause. In recent cases on the Supreme Court’s religion docket, however,
the Court’s doctrine appears to be moving toward a Religion Clause convergence.
The opinion in American Legion perhaps suggests that the symbols cases, prominent
targets of those earlier critiques, have moved closer to the general nondiscrimination
principles recognized in the Court’s free exercise and free speech doctrines. 120 If so, this
is an advance for the Court’s often incoherent Establishment Clause doctrine. But free
speech principles only help at the most abstract level of generality, since under that
doctrine, even speech intended to harm is protected.121 Importing free speech doctrine
would also undermine an accommodationist approach to the Establishment Clause,
because that doctrine, in particular, lacks the tools to explain what is good about religion.
American Legion provides doctrinal answers to questions that have plagued the
Court’s doctrine and frustrated lower courts. In the past, it was necessary to talk about the
application of the Court’s symbols doctrine in micro-categories: holiday display cases, Ten
Commandments cases, memorial cross cases, and in the lower courts, city and county
seals. Although the Court in American Legion rejected the idea of a “grand unifying
theory” of the Establishment Clause, the majority opinion covers the full range of
challenges to “religiously expressive monuments, symbols, and practices.” 122 The Court’s
discussion of religiously-named places (San Diego and Providence, for example), which
might have been vulnerable targets under an expansive reading of the Court’s earlier
doctrine,123 fits historical names within the age-community-culture paradigm. These
examples, together with the opinion’s language, support a broad reading of American
Legion to include all such cases, and not simply crosses or war memorials.
Unlike past religious symbols cases, American Legion was decided 7-2, the largest
majority ever for the Establishment Clause symbols decisions. While there are several
separate opinions in the case, the consensus and cohesion distinguish American Legion
from older symbols cases.
119. The district judge in American Legion called the Court’s Establishment Clause decisions “a law
professor’s dream, and a trial judge’s nightmare.” Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park, 147 F. Supp.
3d 373, 381 (D. Md. 2015).
120. Cf., e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2017) (“Trinity Lutheran [church] is
a member of the community too, and the State’s decision to exclude it . . . must withstand the strictest scrutiny.”).
121. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
122. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2085; see also, e.g., Perrier-Bilbo v. United States, 954 F.3d 413, 425 (1st Cir.
2020), cert. denied, No. 20-340, 2020 WL 6551790 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2020) (applying American Legion to uphold
constitutionality of the phrase “so help me God” in the naturalization oath).
123. Cf., e.g., Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017 (10th Cir. 2008) (challenge to three crosses in
City seal) (finding that “Las Cruces” refers to a valley of crosses where individuals were buried).
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B. Monuments and Symbols: Remaining Questions
i. New Religious Monuments and Symbols
In its modesty and consensus, American Legion leaves some things undecided.
Monuments, symbols, and practices that do not qualify as “longstanding” will not enjoy
the presumption of constitutionality. Therefore, it will be up to courts to determine whether
a newer religious symbol violates the Establishment Clause. In terms of the doctrine that
a court is likely to use, Justice Gorsuch argued that courts should apply the history test of
Town of Greece, regardless of the monument’s age.124 This avoids the difficulty of
determining how old is “old enough” to withstand a lawsuit. 125 Town of Greece supports
Justice Gorsuch’s reading. The relevant tradition in that case was legislative prayer dating
back to the framing of the First Amendment, not the specific town board policy which was
only a decade or so old.126 If courts choose this reading, then the attributes of inclusivity,
nondiscrimination, and tolerance praised in the American Legion plurality might function
as criteria for determining whether a new symbol or practice tethered to a tradition with a
long history is consistent with the Establishment Clause.
Similarly, the majority opinion in American Legion provides four reasons to apply
the presumption rather than Lemon.127 It is not clear whether the Court’s four
considerations are merely dictum explaining the sub silentio overruling of Lemon, or
whether they establish criteria which must be met in order for a longstanding symbol to
qualify for the presumption.128 Yet another reading suggests that the four considerations
may provide criteria to determine whether a new symbol passes constitutional muster.129
In a recent but now overruled symbols decision, however, a district court ignored the
language in American Legion and Town of Greece on the ground that the Court did not
provide lowers courts with a test to apply in place of Lemon.130 If nothing else, this
underscores the fact that the lower courts badly needed the Court to clarify its

124. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2102 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“ . . . [W]hat matters when it comes to assessing
a monument, symbol, or practice isn’t its age but its compliance with ageless principles. The Constitution’s
meaning is fixed, not some good-for-this-day-only coupon, and a practice consistent with our nation’s traditions
is just as permissible whether undertaken today or 94 years ago.”).
125. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 2088.
127. Id. at 2093.
128. See, e.g., Kondrat’yev v. City of Pensacola, 949 F.3d 1319, 1329 (11th Cir. 2020) (cross in city park does
not violate the Establishment Clause under American Legion) (interpreting four considerations as additional
constitutional criteria).
129. Cf., e.g., Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2083 (“The existence of multiple purposes is not exclusive to
longstanding monuments, symbols, or practices, but this phenomenon is more likely to occur in such cases.”).
130. Woodring v. Jackson Cty., 458 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1040 (S.D. Ind. 2020) (applying the Lemon,
endorsement, and coercion tests to a twenty to thirty-year old nativity display) (“Although it frowns upon
the Lemon test, American Legion does not offer its own test for dealing with these types of cases except to
encourage the ‘application of a presumption of constitutionality for longstanding monuments, symbols, and
practices.’”), overruled by Woodring v. Jackson Cty., Indiana, No. 20-1881, 2021 WL 344797, at *14 (7th Cir.
Feb. 2, 2021) (“We hold today that American Legion displaces the purpose and endorsement tests in the context
of Establishment Clause challenges to nativity scenes in passive Christmas displays on government property.”);
see also Kondrat’yev, 949 F.3d at 1326 (Lemon no longer applies to “cases involving religious displays and
monuments—including crosses”).
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Establishment Clause doctrine.131 While the resolution in American Legion settles the
constitutional status of many memorials and monuments around the country, it leaves open
the possibility for litigation over newer symbols and practices.
Take the following example. In Los Angeles County, a Board of Supervisors voted
to remove a Latin cross from a segment of the forty-seven-year-old county seal after being
threatened with litigation.132 The county redesigned the seal to include a depiction of the
San Gabriel mission, which at the time was considered to be an acceptable nod to the
historical influence of Christianity. The cross atop the actual San Gabriel mission had gone
missing during an earthquake retrofitting, and the new seal likewise did not include a cross
on the depiction of the mission. The mission’s cross was replaced a few years later;
thereafter, a new panel of supervisors voted to revise the seal, this time to add a small cross
at the top of the mission.133 In the last chapter of the ten-year fight over the seal,
challengers sued to remove the cross from the new seal, and won.134
Under American Legion, the original cross on the county seal would not be
vulnerable to constitutional challenge.135 Government officials were free to remove it, as
they did. But the addition of the cross by a majority of the new board of supervisors is a
different matter. The county’s argument—that the addition of the cross was necessary for
an accurate depiction of the mission—fits within the types of considerations recognized in
American Legion. The supervisors’ decision must be understood in terms of the fight over
the removal of the cross in the first place, which raises the specter of religious motivation
and divisiveness, and counsels against the new seal’s constitutionality. This seems wrong,
though, under the logic of American Legion. That case teaches that many people,
presumably not just religious people, may be alarmed by the erasure of religious
symbolism from public life. The controversy around the seal arose from the cross’s
removal after having been in place for over forty years. Whether and how new efforts to
restore old symbols or monuments will be treated under American Legion is an open
question. Under a straightforward reading of the decision, however, these efforts do not
enjoy a presumption of constitutionality.
ii. Disrespectful, Intolerant, or Exclusionary Monuments
American Legion’s discussion of inclusivity and nondiscrimination raises the
question of which types of monuments might not follow in that tradition. It is possible that,
after American Legion, even a longstanding monument may violate the Establishment
Clause in an extreme case. If, for example, it had been established that in designing the
Bladensburg Peace Cross, the town had deliberately excluded certain veterans’ names, that

131. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, No More (Old) Symbol Cases, 2018–2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 91, 106
(reviewing American Legion) (“The problem was not at the Supreme Court level. [Lemon] was thoroughly tamed
at that level. The problem was in the lower courts, which do not have the luxury of ignoring or declining to follow
Supreme Court precedent until the high court itself has said to stop.”).
132. Abby Sewell, Christian cross has no place on L.A. County seal, judge rules, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2016),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-la-county-seal-cross-20160407-story.html.
133. See id.
134. See Davies v. L.A. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 177 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1219 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
135. The seal included a cross in a segment of the seal that contained stars and a rendering of the Hollywood
Bowl. Other parts of the seal included the goddess Pomona, oil derricks, a cow, a tuna, and a Spanish Galleon.
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would counsel against its constitutionality.136 The Court’s dictum is consistent with its
focus on the inclusivity reflected in the development of the Bladensburg Cross. The 1925
monument included the names of both black and white veterans, a fact emphasized by the
majority.137
This passage likely also casts doubt on newer monuments designed to antagonize
one’s perceived opponents. In one of the more visible controversies, the New York-based
Satanic Temple proposed to erect a statue on the steps of the Oklahoma courthouse. 138
The statue was proposed at the same time that a Ten Commandments monument in the
same location was being challenged in court.139 The group proposing the satanic
monument noted in the press that they wanted to attract “people of all ages,” and offered
a sketch rendering of the monument, a seated goat figure, Baphomet, with two children at
the figure’s left and right side.140 The proposed monument received publicity but was
never seriously contemplated by the commission. The purpose of the proposed monument,
it seems, was to point up a double standard on the part of those favoring religious
monuments, and perhaps make advocates of the Ten Commandments rethink their
position.141 If such a monument was to be displayed (not likely, I know), it might not run
afoul of the Lemon or endorsement tests even if a challenger argued that it betrayed an
anti-religious purpose on the part of government.142 But the language in American Legion
could nonetheless be read to suggest that such a monument is unconstitutional. 143
Here, however, Justice Kavanaugh’s position that such decisions should be left to
local communities and elected officials counsels wisely.144 In the case of a monument that
136. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2070; see also Perrier-Bilbo, 954 F.3d at 424 (inclusion of the phrase “so help
me God” did not show “deliberate disrespect” of atheists).
137. Id. It can be inferred that the monument’s creators, who decided to include black veterans in 1925, were
not likely to have deliberately excluded Jewish or atheist veterans.
138. Denver Nicks, Satanists Unveil Statue for Oklahoma Capitol, TIME (Jan. 7, 2014),
http://nation.time.com/2014/01/07/satanists-unveil-statue-for-oklahoma-capitol/. A similar statue was offered to
Arkansas. See Avi Selk, A Satanic Idol Goes to the Arkansas Capitol, WASH. POST, (Aug. 17, 2018, 5:07 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2018/08/17/a-satanic-idols-3-year-journey-to-thearkansas-capitol-building/. Another was offered to a small town in Minnesota. See Satanic Temple Sues
Minnesota
City
Over
Proposed
Monument,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Apr.
19,
2019),
https://apnews.com/7ea2decdf9a24f44810404bcbe0e6968.
139. See Prescott v. Okla. Capitol Pres. Comm’n, 373 P.3d 1032 (2015) (monument violates state
constitutional provision); Am. Atheists v. Thompson, 632 Fed. Appx. 522 (10th Cir. 2016) (federal challenge
mooted after state court’s decision to remove monument).
140. See Nicks, supra note 138.
141. A spokesman for the Satanist group said of the lawmaker who donated the Ten Commandments, “He’s
helping a satanic agenda grow more than any of us possibly could . . . You don’t walk around and see too many
satanic temples around, but when you open the door to public spaces for us, that’s when you’re going to see us.”
Okla.
Satanists
seek
monument
by
Statehouse
steps,
USA
TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/08/satanists-oklahoma-statehouse/3908849/ (last updated
Dec. 8, 2013, 4:10 PM). Under the Court’s current doctrine, the Satanic Temple could not force Oklahoma to
display its monument. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2008).
142. The Lemon test forbids a primary purpose of “advancing or inhibiting” religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
Likewise, Justice O’Connor’s no-endorsement test would forbid a message of “disapproval” of religion. Lynch,
465 S. Ct. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In practice, however, Lemon seldom operates in the direction of
striking down arguably anti-religious government action. See, e.g., Vasquez v. L.A. Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1257
(9th Cir. 2007) (no Establishment Clause violation in county’s removal of cross from county seal).
143. Given the publicized motive on the part of the monument’s donor, it would seem to qualify as
intentionally disrespectful to the religious. See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2089 (plurality opinion).
144. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2094 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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is intended to give offense to the religious, very little can be gained by using a lawsuit to
tear it down, particularly after American Legion. The opinion espouses tolerance and civic
unity as Establishment Clause values, and it is far from clear that using the Establishment
Clause to attack such monuments is consistent with either tolerance or inclusivity. In a
world where longstanding monuments in a community are no longer vulnerable simply
because they have religious elements, it makes little sense to weaponize the Establishment
Clause against anti-religious ones.
Such overtures are designed to close the public square to all monuments, and that
would be a shame, especially for minority religions, whose symbols are more likely to be
new rather than old. It would be a loss for the pluralism described in American Legion,
which supports the display of minority religious symbols and monuments.
IV. ACCOMMODATION
The new accommodation represents a reorientation of the Establishment Clause
away from the strict separationism of the replacement campaign. American Legion, in
particular, rejects the premise of the earlier cases—that religion is divisive and offensive.
It supports a positive vision of pluralism by addition, not subtraction. With its focus on
nondiscrimination and inclusivity, this new framing is thoroughly informed by what has
gone before. Even so, American Legion leaves behind some of the ideas from the Court’s
separationist decisions and replaces them with a modest accommodation.
A. A Tentative Theory of Accommodation
It is noteworthy that the fleshing out of a theory of Establishment Clause
accommodation would fall to Justice Breyer. As the swing justice in the Ten
Commandments cases, Justice Breyer’s “legal judgment” about the Establishment Clause
has become the grist of several lower court decisions. In his Van Orden concurrence,
Justice Breyer’s take on divisiveness provided a compromise framework to think about
religious symbols. And in the oral arguments in American Legion, he asked the American
Humanist Association’s lawyer about the proposition that our civil liberties flow from
religious liberty.145 That, for Justice Breyer, would support a theory that old monuments
should not be disturbed, while pluralism forbids new monuments.146
The insight from Justice Breyer’s Van Orden concurrence, cited in the Salazar and
Town of Greece opinions, that shows up in the American Legion majority opinion, is this:
In light of the current disagreements that characterize our public life, the modern question
is whether religious symbols are more divisive than the prospect of tearing them down.
Maintaining the status quo in the area of public religion may be the move that is the least
145. Here is Justice Breyer’s question at oral argument:
I’m saying, a very good book, the Law & Its Compass, Lord Radcliffe, all our liberties come from
freedom of religion. You have your religion. I have mine. And we’re not going to kill each other.
Okay? So we say history counts. Now what [Justice Alito] raised is a problem. So what about saying
past is past, if you go back 93 years, but no more. We’re now 54 religions. We’re now everything
under the sun. And people will take offense. Now how do I do that? Is that sensible? Is it ridiculous?
What do you think?
See Transcript of Oral Argument, Am. Legion v. Am. Humanists Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
146. See id.
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likely to trigger more division. This is a modest conclusion, which does not depend entirely
on the merits of religion itself or its role in the public square. Not entirely. To a limited
extent it does depend on the merits of religion, because if the justices truly deemed religion
to be toxic, no grandfathering doctrine could save it. The presumption in favor of older
monuments rests on an appreciation of religion in our nation’s history. Religion’s residual,
historical value is described by Lord Radcliffe in the book Justice Breyer recommended:
A thing that we forget is that political liberty is a product, almost a by-product, of religious
liberty. The theory of civil rights that we know is common to the history of Europe and
America . . . . Yet this theory is the direct outcome of the religious struggles of the
seventeenth century . . . . What matters for us, the descendants of these founding fathers,
who are accustomed to use their language and their formulas, without sharing their
experience or, often, the background of their ideas, is that these liberties that form the ground
pattern of our State assumed the shape that they did because there were men who believed
with a passionate conviction that they were entitled to worship God in their own way and to
teach their children and to form their characters in the way that seemed to them calculated
to impress the stamp of the God-fearing man. Freedom is primarily a religious ideal:
secondly it is an educational one. If it were to lose contact with the inspiration of these two
impulses I do not know what value should be ascribed to the liberties that would remain.147

As Justice Breyer’s question at oral argument perhaps reveals, there is at work in
American Legion a form of accommodationism that values religion, at least at the margins.
It is not a robust accommodation. Learning the lessons from the older separationist
arguments that tended to harden the opposition, the majority opinion appears to accept the
current reality that not everyone can be convinced about the merits of religion in society.
The opinion assumes a historical, descriptive posture, about what religion was, what
religion did, and how it forms the basis of our other liberties. 148
It is this undercurrent of accommodation that needs to be articulated. Religious
symbols serve as a reminder of religion’s role in the country’s history. In the present, such
symbols may reflect a commitment to the religious liberty of its citizens. 149 The public
display of religious symbols in a pluralistic society is consistent with respect for dissident
religious beliefs.150
B. What Good Is Civil Religion?
The public display of a religious symbol such as the Bladensburg Cross in American
Legion is offensive to some because it is said to dilute religion. Over the years, this
particular concern was deployed to diffuse one of the main objections to strict
separationism—its perceived hostility to religion. This justification for tearing down
147. LORD RADCLIFFE, THE LAW AND ITS COMPASS 70–71 (1960).
148. See, e.g., Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2083 (noting that the Ten Commandments “have historical
significance as one of the foundations of our legal system”).
149. Cf., e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Can State-Sponsored Religious Symbols Promote Religious Liberty?, 52 J.
CATH. LEG. STUDIES 23, 38 (2013) (“Such displays are one way of communicating the public relevance of
religion and by extension the right of all believers, including religious minorities, to exercise their faith in public
settings.”).
150. Cf., e.g., New Hope Family Svs., Inc. v. Poole, 2020 WL 4118201, at *12 (2d Cir. July 21, 2020) (“‘[t]he
Religion Clauses of the Constitution aim to foster a society in which people of all beliefs can live together
harmoniously,’ not a society devoid of religious beliefs and symbols.”) (quoting Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2074).
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monuments posits that in such lawsuits religion is not targeted by hostile forces, but
rescued by friendly ones, from the dilution and secularization that comes with the public
display of religious symbols. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Lynch, for example,
worried that the message of the nativity would be cheapened by a display meant to
highlight the commercial aspects of the holiday season.151 This particular objection does
not appear in the American Legion majority opinion, though it is raised by the dissent.152
The association of the cross with veterans’ memorials, while not universal, is a long
association that has not resulted in any apparent harm to the cross or to religion. Whatever
currency this argument may have in other contexts such as funding, 153 it does not fit well
with symbols. Consider again the example from the beginning of this article.
The green giant in Detroit uses scripture and religiously-themed imagery in an
attempt to capture the city’s ethos. Some might argue that the statue, as government
speech, degrades religion, equates holy scriptures with sports contests, and attempts to
distill distinct traditions into a one-size-fits-all civil orthodoxy. But the facts say otherwise.
The artist’s ecumenicism was acceptable to the religious leaders who viewed it at the time,
and who apparently perceived the sculptural rendering to be inclusive. 154 The religious
leaders’ willingness to approve the sculpture makes sense in light of the purpose and
necessary limits of such a monument, which is not designed to stake out a nuanced position
on a disputed point of theology.
A sculpture like the green giant was never intended to do heavy theological lifting.
Rather, the symbol is intended to punctuate the cultural aspiration to something higher, in
a form just tangible enough to resonate. People can be expected to fill in the blanks with
their own traditions. The symbolism reflects the artist’s view of humanity as given by God
and exemplified in the family.155 It is a contested vision, to be sure, but it is not necessarily
one lacking in depth. The sculpture, like any monument, communicates through its shape,
its size, its referents, and its placement. It may be “loud”156 or quiet, depending on the
perspective of the viewer.
There is another reason that this argument does not quite fit into the frame of
tolerance and inclusivity described in American Legion. The dilution argument
exacerbates the high church-low church, liberal-conservative, traditionalist-progressivist
divide. The barely concealed inference is that people who support public religious symbols
are unstudied, lacking in true piety, or unable to think through the implications of such
symbols for religion. It highlights and reinforces precisely the divide created by such

151. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also id. at 711–12, 725 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2113 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Madison’s Memorial and
Remonstrance).
153. Town of Greece rejects the argument in the context of legislative prayer. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S.
at 582–84; see also Roy, Implications, supra note 51. More recently, the Court in Espinoza rejects the argument
in the context of funding exclusions. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2261 (“A school, concerned about government
involvement with its religious activities, might reasonably decide for itself not to participate in a government
program. But we doubt that the school’s liberty is enhanced by eliminating any option to participate in the first
place.”).
154. See Spirit of Detroit, supra note 1.
155. See supra note 6.
156. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Am. Legion v. Am. Humanists Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (lawyer
for American Humanists describing the Bladensburg Cross).
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lawsuits. This is not the type of conclusion a court should be making.
Avoiding the divisiveness Justice Breyer warned about in Van Orden, in which a
court’s decision to disturb the status quo makes things worse, 157 is a critical piece of the
decision in American Legion.158 Leaving behind the argument about dilution in this
context is consistent with the goal of preserving civic unity.
C. Monuments and Symbols in the Community
i. Religious Symbols
American Legion allows communities to continue to include religion in their
symbols, monuments and ceremonies. In that case the Court was writing against a
backdrop of decisions that viewed such actions with skepticism. As Justice Thomas argued
in a recent opinion, the Court’s past decisions may have influenced public attitudes about
religion’s role in society.159 It is fair to observe that if the historical approach to the
Establishment Clause does not forbid religious symbols, then the Court’s past decisions
have yielded a more secular public square than would have existed otherwise.
A healthy accommodation, on the other hand, acknowledges religion’s role in
society, which is not foreign to our government or traditions. The Court’s more recent
opinions have highlighted George Washington’s accommodationism; in his Farewell
Address he referred to religion and morality as “indispensable supports” to “political
prosperity.”160 It is reflected in the history of the Bladensburg Cross161 and in the spirit of
the interfaith era that produced monuments like the green giant. The religion that provided
an ideological backdrop for the civil rights movement can remind society of its moral
commitments.162 Respect, tolerance, and inclusion are religious as well as secular
precepts. American Legion gives the reader few reasons to agree that respect and tolerance
are things to be pursued, apart from the desire to avoid social conflict. For many citizens,
religion supplies those reasons.
To say that religion is a positive good is not to pine for establishment or backslide
on society’s commitment to pluralism. Nor does it assume that religion will, in this day
and age, receive more than a place at the table alongside the community’s other members,
157. Polling data show that the Court’s decisions striking down monuments were at odds with
contemporaneous public opinion. See TRACEY L. COOK, FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES: SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION, 1947–2013, at 104–10 (2014).
158. For a critical assessment of divisiveness as a constitutional criterion, see Richard W. Garnett, Religion,
Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667 (2006).
159. Espinoza, 591 U.S. at 2266 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that some of the Court’s decisions
“communicat[e] a message that religion is dangerous and in need of policing, which in turn has the effect of
tilting society in favor of devaluing religion”).
160. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2087 (plurality opinion); see also Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 1853–54 (Kagan,
J., dissenting).
161. The fundraising invitation stated: “We, the citizens of Maryland, trusting in God, the Supreme Ruler of
the Universe, Pledge Faith in our Brothers who gave their all in the World War to make [the] World Safe for
Democracy. Their Mortal Bodies have turned to dust, but their spirit Lives to guide us through Life in the way
of Godliness, Justice and Liberty. With our Motto, ‘One God, One Country, and One Flag’ We contribute to this
Memorial Cross Commemorating the Memory of those who have not Died in Vain.” Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at
2076.
162. Cf., e.g., CHARLES MARSH, THE BELOVED COMMUNITY: HOW FAITH SHAPES SOCIAL JUSTICE, FROM THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT TO TODAY (2005).
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ideas, and influences.
ii. Other Divisions
In the current moment, the prospect of religious division has been eclipsed by a
public reckoning and re-appraisal of monuments in light of the country’s past. Statues of
Confederate soldiers and in some cases, even founders such as Jefferson, have been
toppled by activists and spray-painted with epithets like “racist” and “murderer.”163 Apart
from spasms of upheaval, there is a more nuanced reaction on the part of government
officials, one hopes, to listen to communities and decide what to do with monuments and
symbols that no longer reflect their constituents.164 Litigation, though more desirable than
vandalism, often bypasses that process, and has been an unsuccessful vehicle for
objections based on equal protection or other constitutional provisions.
All that American Legion decides is whether challengers with religious objections
to monuments will have success in the courts. Erecting monuments, and in effect, putting
other human beings on a pedestal, is the stuff of communities and societies. American
Legion holds that longstanding religious monuments and symbols do not violate the First
Amendment. The tone of the opinion, however, with its rejection of religious iconoclasm
and its elevation of “citizens living together harmoniously,” certainly speaks to the current
moment. Ultimately, extra-legal considerations will determine the outcome.
V.

CONCLUSION

American Legion stands for the proposition that religious symbols can be a part of a
shared culture without offending pluralism. The decision shows respect for individuals in
history whose religion was central to their lives, and to those, like Washington, who
believed that religion provides the necessary moral supports to uphold society. But
American Legion does not weigh in on those assessments; it does not cast a broad
accommodationist vision about the value of religion to society. This was a missed
opportunity to correct some of the Court’s older separationist decisions which contributed
to the view that religion has no place in public life. Particularly now, the type of civil
religion that is practiced in public might infuse the public ethos with a common, perhaps
163. Annie Gowen, As statues of Founding Fathers topple, debate rages over where protestors should draw
the line, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/as-statues-of-founding-fathers-topple-debaterages-over-where-protesters-should-draw-the-line/2020/07/07/5de7c956-bfb7-11ea-b4f6cb39cd8940fb_story.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2020). In some instances, religious icons and monuments have been
permanently removed, vandalized, or hidden for protection. See, e.g., Andrew J. Campa, Junipero Serra statue
to be moved away from Ventura City Hall, L.A. TIMES (June 18, 2020, 10:23 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-06-18/statue-of-controversial-roman-catholic-saint-to-bemoved-away-from-ventura-city-hall; Cheryl Hurd, Christie Smith & Sergio Quintana, Demonstrators Topple
AREA
NEWS,
Statues
in
San
Francisco
Golden
Gate
Park,
NBC
BAY
https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/san-francisco/demonstrators-topple-statues-in-san-franciscos-goldengate-park/2312839/ (last updated June 22, 2020, 8:24 PM); Matt Fountain, Catholic Church removes Junípero
Serra statue from San Louis Obispo Mission, THE TRIBUNE (June 22, 2020, 6:35 PM),
https://www.sanluisobispo.com/news/local/article243718742.html.
164 A recent example is Mississippi’s decision to remove the Confederate battle emblem from its state
flag. See Emily Wagster Pettus, Mississippi’s new magnolia flag starting to fly after vote, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Nov. 4, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-religion-race-and-ethnicity-mississippi-elections3e31d01e0e0b8c062ea202b7d8424ecf. Legislation required both the removal of the Confederate symbol from
the state’s new flag, and the inclusion of the national motto, “In God We Trust.” Id.
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more charitable, lens with which to approach some of those other divisions.
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The “Spirit of Detroit”

The Bladensburg Peace Cross
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